We theoretically and empirically disentangle various eects of two cuts in the statutory sick pay levels in Germany on long-term absenteeism. The reforms have not led to signicant changes in the average incidence rate and duration of sick leave periods longer than six weeks. The nding is theoretically conrmed assuming that the long-term sick are seriously sick. Thus, moral hazard is less of an issue in the upper end of the sickness spell distribution. We nd eect heterogeneity and duration decreases for certain subsamples. Within ten years, ve billion euros were redistributed from the long-term sick to the insurance pool.
Introduction
The average number of sickness absence days per year and employee varies between 5 and 29 among the OCED countries (OECD, 2006) . Average absence days are to a large degree determined by long-term absence spells. In Germany, which lies in the middle eld of the ranking with 15 days, absence spells of more than six weeks account for 40 percent of all absence days although they only represent 4 percent of all sickness cases (Badura, Schröder, and Vetter, 2008) .
Sick leave payments play a central role in determining public health expenditures and labor costs. Depending on the legislative framework, which diers widely from one country to the next, either the employer or the health insurance provider compensates employees for foregone earnings. What is referred to in Europe as sickness absence insurance is called temporary disability insurance in the US; in both cases, however, it provides compensation for wages losses due to temporary non-work-related illnesses or injuries. Yet the literature reveals a surprising gap of research on such insurance programs and thus a relative paucity of ndings particularly compared to the vast literature on unemployment benets and unemployment duration. The importance of sickness insurance programs can be seen on the example of the US, where ve states have such programs, among them the most populous state of California. There, in 2005, the total sum of net benets for temporary disability insurance amounted to $4.2 billion, while the total sum for unemployment insurance amounted to $4.6 billion (Social Security Administration, 2006 .
A common problem in insurance markets is moral hazard, which drives up insurance costs and leads to an inecient allocation of resources. With sick leave, moral hazard exists if insured employees call in sick despite being able to work. Consequently, full compensation of foregone earnings is seldom provided either by private or by public health insurance systems.
This study exploits a natural experiment that occurred in Germany at the end of 1996.
At that time, compensation payments for long-term absentees with sickness spells of more than six weeks reached the amount of 9.3 billion euros, comprising 7.3 percent of all expenditures by the German Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) system. Employers who are legally obligated to pay employees for the rst six weeks of sick leave were forced to shoulder a burden of 28.2 billion euros (German Federal Statistical Oce, 1998) . In reaction, two health reforms were implemented, both of which cut the level of paid sick leave. The main aim of this paper is to analyze how these reforms aected work absence spells of more than six weeks, and to what extent moral hazard or presenteeism played a role in that part of the sickness spell distribution. Additionally, we calculate the SHI reform savings and redistributional eects.
There is a large body of literature on absenteeism (see for example Ichino and Maggi (2000) ; Askildsen, Bratberg, and Nilsen (2005) ; Ichino and Riphahn (2005) ; Dionne and Dostie (2007) ; Ichino and Moretti (2009) ). However, only a handful of studies have empirically analyzed the relationship between absence behavior and compensation levels using only data from Sweden or the US. The US studies solely focus on the workers' compensation insurance which compensates for work-related illnesses or injuries. Curington (1994) used US data on claim records of minor permanent partial impairments and estimated the eects of several legislative changes in benet levels on the length of work absences from 1964 through 1983. The results are mixed; some amendments induced changes in the work absence behavior, others did not. Another study from the US showed that increases in workers' compensation for temporary total disabilities due to work-related injuries led to an increase in injury duration in several states in the US in the 80s (Meyer, Viscusi, and Durbin, 1995) . Johansson and Palme (2002) modeled the impact of a tax reform and a reduction in replacement levels in the Swedish health insurance system in 1991 on the hazard of work absences. They found that the increase in the absence costs reduced the incidence and length of sickness spells. Henrekson and Persson (2004) used long time series data for Sweden and took advantage of several legislative changes in the compensation levels to show that economic incentives strongly aect absence behavior. Pettersson-Lidbom and Skogman Thoursie (2008) showed that an increase in the benet levels in Sweden in 1987 led to an increase in the incidence of absence spells. The study that comes closest to the one at hand was conducted by Johansson and Palme (2005) , who took the health reform in Sweden in 1991 as an exogenous source of variation. They found that even for absence spells of more than 90(!) days, employees adapt their absence behavior to changes in replacement levels. To our knowledge, this was also the only study to date that has (indirectly) analyzed how long-term absenteeism is aected by reductions in replacement levels. However, all published Swedish studies lack a sound control group, which makes it dicult to disentangle the eects of the sick pay cut from overall economic trends like the deep recession in Sweden of 1991.
All in all, the existing literature suggests that sick people react to economic incentives as classical economic theory would predict. These behavioral reactions could be induced by moral hazard, where employees call in sick from work despite being healthy, or presenteeism, where employees go to work despite being sick.
We analyze the causal eects of two health reforms on long-term absenteeism in Germany. At the end of 1996, sick leave compensation for the rst six weeks was reduced from 100 percent to 80 percent of foregone gross wages. The second reform came into force at the beginning of 1997 and reduced the compensation level from 80 to 70 percent from the seventh week onwards.
1 Both reforms generate exogenous sources of variation and yield testable implications.
To theoretically predict the eects of both reforms on long-term absenteeism, we employ 1 Henceforth, sickness spells that last less than six weeks are dened as short-term absenteeism and sickness spells that last longer than six weeks are dened as long-term absenteeism. a simple dynamic model of absence behavior. First, if moral hazard plays a role and employees on long-term sick leave react to economic incentives, long-term absenteeism should decrease as the direct costs of long-term absenteeism unambiguously increase. Second, the costs of long-term absences decrease relative to the costs of short-term absences. This indirect eect would theoretically impact long-term absenteeism in a positive way. However, under the assumption that employees on long-term sick leave are indeed severely ill, the incentive structure of the sick pay scheme would break down and individuals would not adapt their labor supply to moderate cuts in sick pay.
Since Germany has two independent health care systems existing side by side, we are able to dene subsamples that were aected by none, one, or both of the reforms.
Thus, using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) and dierencein-dierences methods, we can directly estimate the net eect and the direct eect of the two reforms on the incidence and duration of long-term absence spells. Since the legislator also decreased the upper limit of long-term sick pay from 100 percent to 90 percent of monthly net wages, the treatment intensity is likewise exogenously varied. Hence, we are not only able to dene treatment and control groups but also to analyze the reform eects by treatment intensity in relation to gross wages.
Our results indicate that on average, the cut in replacement levels did not produce an eect on the incidence and duration of long-term sickness spells, either directly or indirectly. This result is in line with our model predictions if we assume that employees on long-term sick leave are indeed seriously ill. However, we nd evidence of heterogeneity in the eects. For the poor and middle-aged persons employed full-time, the duration of longterm absenteeism decreased signicantly, although this decrease was of small magnitude.
In contrast to the previous literature, these ndings suggest that work absence behavior of more than thirty days is not very responsive to economic incentives, which implies that moral hazard is of little importance in this context. We calculate that the SHI saved around 5.5 billion euros due to the cut in long-term sick pay from 1997 to 2006. Five billion thereof were redistributed from the long-term sick to the insurance pool in order to achieve lower contribution rates. It is important to note that once an optionally insured person opts out of the SHI system, a return is virtually impossible. Employees above the income threshold are legally not allowed to switch back, and employees who fall below the income threshold in subsequent years may switch back but lose their provisions, which are not transferable (neither between PHI and SHI, nor between the dierent private health insurance providers). In reality, a change to a private health insurance provider can be regarded as a lifetime decision, and switching between the SHI and the PHI system as well as between private health insurance providers is very rare.
The German Sick Pay System
If an employee falls sick, a certicate from a physician is required from the third day of sick leave. The employer is legally obliged to pay sickness compensation up to six weeks per sickness spell regardless of the employee's health insurance. From the seventh week onwards, the physician needs to issue dierent certicates at reasonable time intervals of usually one week, and sick leave is paid by the SHI or the PHI. The replacement level for persons on long-term sick leave insured under the SHI is codied in the social legislation and is the same for all those with SHI insurance. In 1996, SHI payments for long-term absenteeism made up 7.3 percent of all SHI expenditures, which equaled 9.3 billion euros (German Federal Statistical Oce, 1998) .
The system for monitoring employees on sick leave is a potentially important determinant of the degree of moral hazard in the insurance market. In Germany, the Medical 
The Policy Reforms
Two health reforms were implemented at the end of 1996. From October 1996 on, the replacement level during the rst six weeks of sickness was reduced from 100 percent to 80 percent of foregone gross wages. 3 This reform had, at least theoretically, an indirect inuence on sickness spells of more than six weeks and should therefore be considered. A second health reform act became eective on January 1, 1997. The replacement level from the seventh week onwards was cut from 80 percent to 70 percent of foregone earnings for those insured under the SHI. 4 Figure 1 illustrates the reduction in the replacement rates for short and long-term absence spells.
[Insert Figure 1 BGBl. I 1996 BGBl. I p. 1476 BGBl. I -1479 It became eective at October 1, 1996. It should be noted that we are not able to precisely identify those employees who were aected by this law, as employers and unions voluntarily agreed in some collective wage agreements to continue the old sick pay scheme. However, as this reform is not the focus of this paper, this is of minor importance.
well. Second, before 1997, the replacement level was 80 percent of the gross wage if the total amount did not exceed 100 percent of the net wage. After 1997, the replacement level decreased to 70 percent of the gross wage and the benet cap to 90 percent of the net wage.
These upper limits introduce additional exogenous variation and allow us to generate an index that mirrors the cut in long-term sick pay on a continuous scale from zero percent of gross wages to 10 percent of gross wages.
To deter people from substituting several short-term absence spells for a single longterm absence spell, with the former compensated by a higher amount of sick pay in total, the law on employer-provided sick pay contains a specic passage. 5 The passage stipulates that if employees repeatedly have absence periods due to the same illness, they are no longer entitled to 100 percent employer-provided sick pay. Consequently, there is no incentive to substitute multiple short-term spells for a single long-term spell.
We now dene subsamples that have been aected dierently by the two health reforms, thereby serving as treatment and control groups in the evaluation of this natural experiment.
As the sickness compensation for long-term absence is paid for by the health insurance and not by the employer, the second reform did not aect privately insured people, whose replacement levels are subject to individual insurance contracts.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
We can easily see from Table 1 that private-sector employees who were insured with the SHI (subsample 1) were aected by both reforms. In contrast, SHI-insured public-sector employees (subsample 2) were aected by the reduction in long-term sick pay but not by the cut in short-term sick pay due to political decisions. The same holds for SHI-insured trainees (subsample 3). The last two subsamples, PHI-insured public-sector employees and self-employed persons, were not aected by any of the reforms. As Table 2 visualizes, we accordingly dened two treatment groups and one control group.
[Insert Table 2 about here] 3 A Dynamic Model of Absence Behavior
In the following, we analyze the absence behavior of an individual i within a two-period model. We modify a model by Brown (1994) so as to be able to study the theoretical eects of the German health reforms on long-term absence behavior. The individual's utility function can be specied as: 
This means that each sickness level is equally probable. At time t, individuals are aware of their sickness level σ t but concerning the subsequent period, only the probability distribution f (σ t+1 ) is known.
To adequately model the German sick pay scheme, we dene the replacement level during long-term sickness spells as r l with 0 < r l < 1 and the replacement level during short term sickness spells as r h with 0 < r h < 1. Moreover, r l < r h < w, where w represents the gross wage and is normalized to one. Sick pay is always provided when the individual is absent from work. Long-term sickness is when an individual is on sick leave for at least two continuous periods. Hence, in the rst absence period after a working period, the sick pay is r h , which is reduced to r l in the second period. If a working period follows a long-term sickness period, the replacement level for the next sickness period is again r h .
A key feature of this simple dynamic model is the concept of the reservation sickness level, σ * t , as introduced by Barmby, Sessions, and Treble (1994) . The reservation sickness level is dened as the value of σ t such that an individual is indierent between going to work and staying home. To be more precise, at σ * t the utility from working in period 1 plus the expected utility in period 2 equals the utility from being absent in period 1 plus the expected utility in period 2. As we are primarily interested in the reform eects on long-term absenteeism, we assume that our individual was on sick leave in t − 1 and is eligible for sick pay in t with r l as the replacement level. In t, the reservation level is hence implicitly dened by:
The left hand side of this equation represents the utility in period t if the individual continues to be on sick leave with sick leave compensation r l and leisure T , where T is the total time available. The expected utility from period t + 1 is added and discounted with the individual's time preference rate ρ. Analogously, the right hand side adds up the discounted utility in t + 1 with the utility from working h hours and enjoying T − h hours leisure in t.
6
The individual decides whether to be absent from work by maximizing utility over both periods. If σ t > σ * t , i.e., the actual sickness level exceeds the reservation sickness level, the individual stays away from work as more weight is placed on leisure rather than consumption. In other words, if employees are seriously sick, they value recuperation time far more than materialistic needs and go on sick leave. On the other hand, if σ t < σ * t , individuals maximize their utility by working h hours.
One has to bear in mind that the decision to be absent from work or not has implications for the sick pay level in the next period. If individuals are absent from work in t, they get r l in t as well as in t + 1 if their sickness continues to be so severe that σ t+1 > σ a * t+1 , where σ a * t+1 is the reservation sickness level in t + 1 conditional on having been absent in t. If they work in t and fall sick in t + 1, with σ t+1 > σ w * t+1 , their sick pay is r h . Hence we can dene
) which is the expected utility in t + 1 conditional on having been absent at time t:
As can be seen from (3), the expected utility in t + 1 is expressed as the weighted average of the expected utility from attending work and being absent from work. The weights represent the probability that σ t+1 is less than the reservation sickness level and exceed the reservation sickness level, respectively. The expected values of consumption and leisure are evaluated by using the conditional probability distribution. Conditional on σ t+1 being between 0 and σ a * t+1 , the expected value of σ t+1 , which is σ a * t+1 2 for the uniform distribution, is taken to evaluate the utility of a working employee. Analogously, the expected value of σ t+1 , conditional on being between σ a * t+1 and 1,
, is substituted into the utility function for an absent employee.
Equivalently dened is E(U work t+1 ) which is the expected utility in t + 1 conditional on having worked in t:
Finally, we derive σ a * t+1 and σ w * t+1 as: 6 We assume a rigid employment contract without the possibility of working overtime or less than the contracted hours h.
We nd that ∂σ a * t+1 ∂r l
< 0 and ∂σ w * t+1 ∂r h
< 0, which means that a decrease in sick pay levels has a positive impact on the reservation sickness levels, resulting, ceteris paribus, in a lower probability to be absent from work. This is what we would expect intuitively when the costs of sickness rise. Moreover, static labor supply models also predict a decrease in absenteeism with decreasing sick pay rates (Brown and Sessions, 1996) . Henceforth, we call this the direct eect of a reduction in sick pay.
As r l < r h < w, we get σ a * t+1 > σ w * t+1 meaning that the probability to work in t + 1 is higher for an employee who stayed home in t as opposed to an employee who worked in t.
The reason is that the gap between wages and sick pay, i.e., the cost of absence, is bigger for long-term absenteeism as compared to a short-term absenteeism. This is a reasonable approximation of the statutory sick leave regulations in Germany.
Plugging equations (3) to (6) into (2) and solving for the reservation sickness level σ * t yields:
We see that σ * t equals σ a * t+1 plus a discounted positive term which we interpret as the impact of future absence costs on the today's decision to be absent from work or not.
It illustrates how the German sick pay scheme, which penalizes long absence spells more severely than short absence spells, impacts the probability to stay at home in the current period. In the case of a at sick pay level, which would not depend on the length of absence, the second term would vanish and the probability of being absent from work today would equal the probability of being absent from work tomorrow. Remember that this holds under the assumption that every health status is equally probable and outside the individual's inuence. Utility-maximizing individuals need to take the impact of today's absence behavior on future sick pay entitlements into account.
We now predict how long-term absenteeism is aected if the sick pay levels for short and long absence spells decrease and the employee is entitled to r l in case of being absent. Consider rst the eects of a reduction in r l .
We see from equation (9) that the total eect of a decrease in r l is the sum of the direct eect ∂σ a * t+1 ∂r l and an additional factor. Hence, it is crucial to consider the impact of the discounted future term when evaluating the impact of a reduction in r l . The second term represents the indirect eect that arises from the gap in the replacement levels between long and short-term absence spells, r h − r l . In case of a at compensation scheme the gap closes and the indirect eect disappears. Ceteris paribus, a reduction in r l widens the compensation gap, increases future absence costs, and thus aects long-term absenteeism negatively, thereby strengthening the direct eect.
Now we consider a reduction in r h . Note that there is no direct eect of a decrease in r h for people in an ongoing long-term sickness spell. These people continue to get r l if they remain absent, and get their full wage if they go back to work. However, a reduction in r h would, ceteris paribus, diminish the compensation gap between short and long-term absences and thus exert a positive eect on long-term absenteeism.
We now want to relax the rather restrictive assumption that the sickness level σ t is independent of the sickness level in the previous period and that every sickness level is equally probable in every period. Suppose that the sickness levels are serially correlated and that r h is paid for sickness spells up to six periods. If the employee continues to be on sick leave in the seventh period, r l is paid. For a sickness spell to last more than six periods, the illness must to be so severe that σ t > σ * t in every period. If that is the case, the incentive structure of our sick leave scheme breaks down and the employee is absent from work in every period. Hence, if employees are seriously sick, which means that their degree of sickness tends towards unity, and the replacement levels change only moderately without taking on extreme values, then these employees do not react to economic incentives.
In Section 6, we empirically estimate the net eect as well as the direct eect of the German health reforms on long-term absenteeism.
Data And Variable Denitions
The dataset that we use is the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). The SOEP is an annual representative household survey that was started in 1984 and sampled more than 20,000 persons in 2006. Further details can be found elsewhere (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp, 2007) .
Depending on our empirical estimation strategy, we use data of the years 1994 to 1999.
As our goal is to evaluate a reduction in wage compensation levels, we drop non-working respondents and those who are not eligible for long-term sickness compensation (i.e., people who earn less than 400 euros per month and working students). Furthermore, we drop observations with missings and restrict our sample to respondents aged 18 to 65.
Endogenous and Exogenous Variables
The SOEP contains various questions about the usage of health services and health insurance. We generate our rst dependent dummy variable, which measures the incidence of long-term absenteeism, from the following question that was asked continuously from 1994 on: Were you sick from work for more than six weeks at one time last year? Since sick pay is reduced after six weeks because it is no longer disbursed by the employer but by the health insurance, and since a dierent certicate needs to be issued by the physician, measurement errors should play a minor role here.
To measure how many days long-term sick pay was received, we use the following SOEP question: How many days were you not able to work in 199X because of illness? We generate our second dependent variable by subtracting, for those who had a long-term absence spell, the number of employer-paid sick days namely 30 from the total number of days absent. 7 8 Clearly, this duration variable is subject to measurement errors as we assume that the respondents had no other absence spells. Moreover, comparing the average duration of long-term sick pay with ocial data, it becomes clear that we face a systematic underreporting in the survey data, as persons with long-term sickness spells are less likely to participate in the survey. However, if the cut in long-term sick pay did not aect the probability to participate in the survey and did not aect the sickness spell distribution, this duration measure is sucient to evaluate the reform eects. While the former assumption clearly holds, one might argue that the latter is more problematic. Those who were only aected by the cut in long-term sick pay have an incentive to interrupt their long-term sickness spell and to start a new one. Luckily, we do not need to fear such behavioral eects since, according to German law, the claim for employer-provided sick pay expires 7
As noted above, public servants enjoy special privileges. The period in which their employer provides a 100 percent sickness compensation varies from 6 weeks to 26 weeks depending on seniority. Since we have detailed information about the seniority levels, we are able to identify privileged public servants and redene for them long-term absence spells which eventually coincide with the period of the lower SHI sick pay. Hence, for public servants, we subtract the benet days that are provided by the employer and that vary between 6 and 26 weeks. For those respondents who indicated having been absent for more than six weeks but who reported a total number of sick days of less than 30, we replaced the values with a one. By estimating a Zero-inated Negbin-2 model (see Section 5.2) and predicting the benet days, we imputed the values for respondents with a missing on the benet day variable. We imputed the values only for respondents who indicated that they were on long-term sick leave and who had no missings on the other relevant variables.
in case of such sickness spell substitutions (see Section 2.3 for more details). Once more, the importance of having various treatment groups is emphasized here. By comparing Treatment Group 1 with our controls, we cannot identify potential reform eects, since a negative impact on the duration measure might be caused by the decrease in short-term sick pay. Contrasting Treatment Group 2, which was aected only by the cut in long-term sick pay, with the Control Group, and bearing in mind that sickness spell substitutions are not of relevance here, we can reliably estimate the impact of the reform on the length of long-term sickness spells.
As both questions on absenteeism refer to the last year, we take the information of time variant covariates from the previous year if the respondent was interviewed the year before. For respondents who were not interviewed in the previous year, we take the current information and assume that it did not change meanwhile.
The whole set of explanatory variables can be found in Appendix A and is categorized as follows. A rst group incorporates variables on personal characteristics, like the dummies on gender, immigrant, East Germany, partner, married, children, disabled, good health, bad health, no sports, and age (age 2 ). The second group consists of educational controls such as the degree obtained, the number of years with the company, and whether the person was trained for the job. The last group contains explanatory variables on job characteristics.
Among them are blue-collar worker, white-collar worker, the size of the company, and the monthly gross wage.
Control Group, Treatment Groups, and Treatment Intensity Indices
As described in Section 2.3 and visualized in Table 2 , we generate one control group and two treatment groups. For each of the treatment groups we compute a treatment index that represents the treatment intensity. By these means, we estimate the net and the direct reform eects.
The SOEP is very detailed about the insurance status and the workplace of the respondents, which allows us to precisely assign them to the control and treatment groups.
However, self-employed persons insured under the SHI have the option to opt out of longterm sick pay in order to obtain lower contribution rates. As we are unable to identify respondents with such contracts, we drop them.
Another advantage of the SOEP is the extensive data about gross wages, net wages, and variable income components such as Christmas or vacation bonuses. The SOEP group deals precisely with the problem of missing income data, and imputes values thoroughly (Frick and Grabka, 2005) . Thanks to this information and the legally dened upper limits for long-term sick pay, we are able to accurately generate treatment indices that display the decrease in replacement levels continuously from 0 to 10 percent of individual gross wages.
We rstly specify three treatment dummy variables. Treatment Group 1 is a dummy 5 Estimation Strategy and Identication
Probit Specication
To estimate the causal reform eects on the incidence of long-term absence spells, we t a dierence-in-dierences (DiD) probit model of the following type:
P r(y it = 1) = Φ(α + βp97 t + γD it + δDiD it + x it ζ)
with i representing individuals and t representing time. The dummy p97 t has a one for posttreatment years and a zero for pre-treatment years. The second empirical specication intends to estimate how the policy reform aected the length of long-term absence spells in post-treatment periods. As the number of benets days is a count with excess zero observations and overdispersion, i.e., the conditional variance exceeding the conditional mean, we t count data models. Based on the Akaike (AIC)
and Bayesian (BIC) information criteria as well as on Vuong tests, we found two model specications to be appropriate.
The rst is a Hurdle-at-Zero Negative Binomial Model, also simply referred to as a two-part model, which models two distinct statistical processes for the incidence and the duration of long-term absenteeism. The rst part represents the probability of crossing the hurdle, e.g., of being absent long-term, and can be estimated by a logit or probit model equivalent to that in equation (11). The second part models the duration of long-term absenteeism by tting a truncated at zero Negative Binomial-2 (NegBin-2) model (Deb and Trivedi, 1997) .
The second count data model to be employed is the so-called Zero-Inated Negative
Binominal Model that equally allows diverging statistical processes for the incidence and duration of long-term absenteeism. The underlying statistical mechanism dierentiates between employees on long-term sick leave and those not on long-term sick leave, and assigns dierent probabilities that are parameterized as functions of the covariates to each group. The binary process is again specied in form of a logit or a probit model, and the count process is now modeled as an untruncated NegBin-2 model for the binary process to take on value one. Hence, zero counts may be generated in two ways: as realizations of the binary process and as realizations of the count process when the binary process is one (Winkelmann, 2008) .
Both count data models incorporate the negative binomial distribution. The reason is 9 Puhani (2008) has shown that the advice of Ai and Norton (2004) to compute the discrete double dierence
∆p97∆D is not of relevance in nonlinear models when the interest lies in the estimation of a treatment eect. Using treatment dummy variables, the average treatment eect on the treated at the time of the treatment is given by
which is exactly what we calculate and present throughout the paper.
that, in contrast to the more restrictive Poisson distribution, it does not only take excess zeros into account but also allows for overdispersion and unobserved heterogeneity. The NegBin model can be seen as a special case of a continuous mixture model. In the notation of Cameron and Trivedi (2005) , the NegBin distribution can be described as a density mixture of the following form:
where f (y|µ, ν) is the conditional Poisson distribution and γ(ν|α) is assumed to be gammadistributed with ν as an unobserved parameter with variance α. Γ(.) denotes the gamma integral and µ = exp(Xβ) where the matrix X incorporates the same variables as the probit model in equation (11). The NegBin can be derived in dierent ways; it has dierent variants and dierent interpretations. Note that in the special case of α = 0 the NegBin collapses to a simple Poisson model.
Identication
The core identication assumption in every DiD model is the common time assumption.
It assumes that the estimated eect is due entirely to the policy intervention and that in the absence of the intervention and conditional on the covariates, the outcome variable of the treated group would have developed in the same way as the outcome variable of the controls. Depending on the context, this may be a more or less strong assumption. Our identication strategy is based on various pillars, making us condent that we have reliably identied causal reform eects.
First, we should point out that we use a distinct control group that was not aected by the reforms. Additionally, the identication of two dierent treatment groups that were aected by a single and both reforms, respectively, makes it possible to distinguish between direct and net reform eects. Since the insurance status of the respondents as well as their job characteristics and earnings are collected accurately, we can assign people very precisely to the control and treatment groups.
Second, we exploit an additional source of exogenous variation which allows us to distinguish eects by treatment intensity (see Section 2.3 for more details). By using income information that dierentiates between gross wages, net wages, and fringe benets, we are able to generate treatment intensity variables remarkably exactly. In the period under ob-servation, the implementation of the reform and the variation in the treatment intensity were clearly exogenous to the individuals and politically determined. We have not found evidence that the policy change was endogenous in the sense that the reform was a reaction to increasing absence rates (Besley and Case, 2000; German Federal Statistical Oce, 2008) . Rather, it was a fairly random means of cutting health expenditures and was used mainly as an instrument of the unpopular Kohl administration, which took oce in 1982, to demonstrate strength and capacity to act.
Third, as in almost every study that builds upon natural experiments, the control group and the two treatment groups dier signicantly with respect to most of the observed characteristics (see Table 3 ). For example, in comparison to the Control Group, Treatment Group 1 includes fewer females but more immigrants, and the employees are less educated. Treatment Group 2 is younger than the other subsamples, less often married, and includes more white-collar workers without tenure. The heterogeneity in most of the observable characteristics is due to the federal regulations of the German health insurance and hence unavoidable. However, we argue that it is very unlikely that the common time trend assumption is violated as a) the dierences in characteristics are not the result of treatment-related self-selection but politically determined, b) we have a very rich dataset and are able include a variety of controls, c) the key determinant of long-term absenteeism is the health status, which we are able to control for. Recall that it poses no problem if the subsamples have dierent probabilities of being aected by long-term sickness; the identifying assumption would only be violated if unobservables existed that would impact the change of these probabilities dierently. In case of long-term absenteeism it is dicult to think of unobservables that have a diverging eect on the dynamic of the outcome all the more after having controlled for a rich set of health-related, personal, educational, and jobrelated covariates as well as the annual regional unemployment rate, regional time-invariant eects, and annual time trends.
[Insert Table 3 about here] We can see from Table 4 that relatively few covariates aect long-term absenteeism signicantly. More educated employees are less often absent for long-term periods, and rm size is positively correlated with long absence spells. As expected, the most important driver of long-term absenteeism is health status. This is not surprising since the main reasons for long-term absences are persistently low health stocks and health shocks like unexpected illnesses and accidents (Müller et al., 1998). [Insert Table 3 [Insert Figure 2 about here] Fourth, we not only estimate the reform eects on the incidence of long-term absenteeism but also the eects on the length of long-term absence spells. Although we work with survey data, which makes it possible to take a rich set of background variables into account (at the cost of having no detailed spell data), we have good arguments why the available sick absence information is sucient (see Section 4.1).
Fifth, to prove the consistency of our results, we perform various robustness checks.
Thanks to the panel structure, we are able to control for the labor force composition by using balanced panels. Moreover, we experiment with dierent pre-and post-reform years and pool the data over only two years. Additionally, we restrict the sample size to singles, persons aged 25 to 55 employed full-time, and split the sample at the median wage.
In recent years, there has been an extensive debate about the drawbacks and limitations of DiD estimation (Conley and Taber, 2005) . A particular concern is the underestimation of OLS standard errors due to serial correlation in case of long time horizons and unobserved (treatment and control) group eects. To deal with the serial correlation issue, we focus on short time horizons. As Bertrand, Duo, and Sendhil (2004) have shown, the main source for understating the standard errors stems from serial correlation of the outcome and the intervention variable and is basically eliminated when focusing on less than ve periods.
While there is consensus about the serial correlation problem, the issue with unobserved common group eects is still a matter of considerable debate. If one takes the objection of Donald and Lang (2007) seriously, then it would not be possible to draw inferences from DiD analyses in the case of few groups, meaning that no empirical assessment could be performed. We subscribe to the view of Wooldridge (2006) , who says of the study by Donald and Lang (p. 18 But the DL criticism in the G = 2 case is no dierent from a common question raised for any dierence-indierences analyses: How can we be sure that any observed dierence in means is due entirely to the policy change? To characterize the problem as failing to account for an unobserved group eect is not necessarily helpful. 10
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In this very readable extended version of an older published AER paper (Wooldridge, 2003) , Wooldridge (2006) discusses several other shortcomings and assumptions of the estimation approach proposed by Donald and Lang (2007) . In another place, Wooldridge (2007) asks rhetorically whether introducing more than sampling error into DiD analyses was either necessary or desirable. Should we conclude nothing can be learned in such settings? , he questions (p. 3). Moreover, he uses the well known Meyer, Viscusi, and Durbin (1995) study as another example:
It seems that, in this example, there is plenty of uncertainty in estimation, and one cannot obtain a tight estimate without a fairly large sample size. It is unclear what we gain by concluding that, because we are just identifying the parameters, we cannot perform inference in such cases. In this example, it is hard to argue that the uncertainty associated with choosing low earners within the same state and time period as the control group somehow swamps the sampling error in the sample means. (p.3 to 4).
Besides our focus on short time spans to resolve serial correlation concerns, we use robust standard errors and correct for clustering at the individual level throughout the analysis.
Finally, an important feature of this study is that there is no selection into or out of the treatment group, which is a central issue in other settings, e.g., when labor market programs are evaluated. Switching between the two diverse health care systems that were aected dierently by the reforms is not allowed for the great majority. We are able to identify the only subsample that has this right and exclude it in our robustness checks.
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Our basic empirical strategy is thus to pool the data for the years 1995 to 1998 and to estimate DiD probit as well as count data models where we employ the variables Treatment Group 1 to 3 as well as Treatment Index 1 and 2, respectively. Table 5 provides the unconditional DiD estimate of the reform's net eect and direct eect on the incidence of long-term absenteeism. The unconditional long-term absence rate fell for Treatment Group 1 from 6.16 percent in the pre-treatment years 1995 and 1996 to 5.92 percent in 1997 and 1998. The rate for Treatment Group 2 fell from 3.77 to 3.56 percent.
Results
Without the availability of a control group and by means of before-after estimators one could erroneously attribute the total decrease to the reform. However, the absence rate for the Control Group also fell from 3.49 to 3.11 percent, resulting in overall dierencein-dierences estimates of +0.13 and +0.17 percent, respectively. Table 6 shows the same estimates for the duration of long-term absence spells. The average number of benet days per insured person fell from 3.62 to 3.17 days for Treatment Group 1 and from 2.58 to 1.95 days for Treatment Group 2. It also decreased slightly from 1.98 to 1.95 days for the Control Group leading to unconditional DiD estimates of -0.42 and -0.61 days.
[Insert Table 5 and 6 about here] The DiD estimator is now incorporated into a regression framework. Table 7 reports the results from six model specications that dier with respect to the inclusion of additional controls and measure the impact on the incidence of long-term absenteeism. Each specication represents a probit model equivalent to equation (11) with a dependent variable that is 1 if the respondent had a long-term sickness spell in the previous year and zero otherwise. The variable of interest is displayed as DiD1 and consists of an interaction between the dummy Treatment Group 1 and the year dummy p1997. In every specication, 11 The only group that has the right to opt out of the SHI is that of optionally insured employees (selfemployed and high-income earners above the income threshold). However, it is very unlikely that employees opted out of the SHI as a reaction to the cut in long-term sick pay. Opting out is a lifetime decision that is practically not feasible for the elderly due to extremely high premiums and that makes no sense for the young since they are very likely to be unaected by long-term absenteeism anyway. We consider the possibility that selection out of the treatment played a role in Section 6. [Insert Table 7 about here]
In the next step, we disentangle the net eect of the reform into a direct eect and an indirect eect, and estimate their impact on the incidence of long-term absenteeism separately. As has been shown theoretically in Section 3, this is crucial since it may be that the indirect reform eect compensated the direct eect, rendering the net reform eect insignicant and highlights the importance of the separate analysis displayed in Table 8 .
Column 1 once again shows the net eect; the regression model equals Model 6 in Table 7 .
Column 2 displays the direct eect of the reduction in long-term sick pay on the absence rate. Again, we used equation (11) but in contrast to column 1, Treatment Group 2, i.e., those only aected by the cut in long-term sick pay, has been interacted with the postreform year dummy to get the DiD2 estimate. It is easy to see that the DiD2 coecient is statistically not dierent from but close to zero, which is also the case for DiD3 in column 3 where we used Treatment Group 3 which contrasts those solely aected by the cut in long-term sick pay with those aected by both reforms.
[Insert Table 8 about here] Treatment Index 1 and 2 represent the treatment intensity of the reform, namely the cut in long-term sick pay as a percentage of the individual's gross wage. As before, we use these variables to estimate the net eect as well as the direct eect of the reforms on the incidence of long-term absenteeism. And as before, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that the dierence-in-dierences estimate is statistically dierent from zero. Note that all DiD point estimates are practically zero (see Table 9 ).
[Insert Table 9 about here] Table 10 gives us the DiD estimates when we use the number of days that long-term benets were received as dependent variable and estimate count data models using Treatment Index 2. The non-signicant point estimate for the whole sample is -0.041, and conditional on those who had a long-term absence spell, it is -0.904 (days). To sum up, we do not nd evidence that the reforms had an overall signicant impact on absenteeism either on the incidence or on the length of long-term absence spells.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
Robustness Checks and Heterogeneity in Eects
Until now our estimation strategy was to pool the data over four years, which means that we allowed the sample composition to change over the years. As people with longterm absence spells have a higher probability to leave the labor force as a result of their (probably severe) illness, we should check whether this selection out of the labor market distorted our results. From those who had a long-term absence spell in 1996, 7.1 percent did not answer the questionnaire one year later for unknown reasons (one respondent died and one moved abroad). We do not nd evidence that long-term illness led to a higher probability of dropping out of the sample in the subsequent year, since 7.7 percent of the respondents without long-term absence spells did not participate in the following year. One the other hand, 74.6 percent of those who were absent for a long-term period in 1996 were employed full-time at that time, whereas one year later, this number decreased to 62.3 percent for those who remained in the sample.
12 Especially if we had found a signicant reform eect, one could have argued that the estimate was biased and caused by selection out of the labor market. There are several reasons why this selection eect is only of minor importance in our setting.
First, in light of the selection, it is even more remarkable that we do not nd signicant reform eects. Second, in 1998 (with information about 1997) the SOEP group drew a random refreshment sample that covered all existing subsamples and a total of 1,067
observations (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp, 2007) . Thanks to this refreshment sample, the employment status distribution over those who had long-term sickness spells in 1996 and 1997 remained very stable. Under the consideration of the new observations, in total 73.1 percent of those who suered long-term absence spells in 1997 were employed full-time (as compared to 62.3 percent without considering the refreshment sample).
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Third, through the availability of a control group that we observe over time, we are able to control for treatment-independent selection out of the labor market. 14 In the absence of a control group one could easily confuse the illness-related selection out of the labor market with a causal reform eect, since it is natural that sickness absence rates decrease over time as the sample ages.
Finally, as we use panel data, we can take account of labor force composition by using a balanced sample. In the following, we perform additional tests to prove the robustness of our results and to check whether heterogeneity in the reform eects is of importance. Table   12 The ratio of full time employed who were not absent for long-term periods was 71.9 percent in 1996 and 72.6 percent in 1997.
For the other employment status groups, the deviation was less than 1.6 percent.
14 We cannot, however, entirely exclude the possibility that the reform had an eect on the decision to leave the labor market voluntarily. We are unable to observe how large the share of voluntary labor market quitters was. However, as the cut in long-term sick pay was moderate and nancial penalties are substantially higher for unemployed or retirees, we believe that reform-induced selection out of the labor market plays a negligible role.
11 reports results for the direct eect specication on the duration of long-term absenteeism using Treatment Index 2.
As a rst test, we center the data two years around the reform (column 1). Afterwards, we restrict our sample to the years 1996 and 1997, balance it, and consider only employees who were eligible for long-term sick pay in both years and answered the SOEP questionnaire in both years (column 2). An alternative robustness check would be to take 1995 as reference year and contrast it to 1997 and 1998. It might be that pull-forward eects played a role and that people adapted their behavior in 1996, when the reform plans were made public (column 3). However, this is not very probable as many catalysts of long-term absences happen unexpectedly. Since people who started their long-term absence spell in 1996 and carried it over to 1997 took advantage of a transitory arrangement and were not exposed to reduced sick pay, we contrasted the years 1995/1996 and 1998 in column 4. Another check would be to restrict the sample to full-time employed people aged 25 to 55 (column 5) and to singles (column 6) as the income of other household members may have an impact on the exposure to treatment. On the household level, the relevant parameter might be the decrease in total household income rather than individual wages. Since optionally SHI insured could have switched to the PHI system as a reaction to the reform, we exclude all optionally insured people in column 7. We also split the sample at the median gross wage (columns 8 and 9).
[Insert Table 11 about here]
As can be seen in Table 11 , we nd signicant and negative reform eects on the length of long-term absence spells for middle-aged full-time employed and the poor, which suggests heterogeneity in the reform eects.
15 Middle-aged full-time employed people most likely need to support a family and might be the main earners in their household. The poor are also likely to be more crucially dependent on their full salary, which would imply that the reform induced a higher degree of presenteeism in these subsamples. On the other hand, the poor are more likely to work in less satisfying jobs and, thus, the reform might have reduced the degree of moral hazard as well.
According to the estimates, a one unit increase in Treatment Index 1 which equals an increase in the absence costs of about 5 percent, led to a decrease in the average number of benet days per case of around 0.04 and 0.11, respectively.
[Insert Table 12 about here]
Besides displaying graphs on the outcome variable trends by treatment status, another standard method for checking the robustness of DiD estimates is to perform placebo regressions and to estimate the reform eects for years without a reform. For the assumption 15
In the working paper version, the same exercise is performed on the incidence of long-term absenteeism. None of the specications is statistically signicant from zero and all point estimates are very close to zero in magnitude.
of common time trends of control and treatment group to hold, none of the placebo reform eects should be signicant. Table 12 displays placebo regression results on the incidence and duration of long-term absenteeism for the years 1994 to 1996. All placebo estimates turn out to be insignicant.
Calculation of SHI Reform Savings
Long-term sick pay amounted to 80 percent of the monthly gross wage before the reform and to 70 percent after the reform up to the contribution ceiling. The benet cap decreased from 100 percent of the monthly net wage before the reform to 90 percent after the reform.
We calculate the total price adjusted SHI reform savings from 1997 to 2006 reecting the redistributional eect of the reform. Reducing the sick pay level for the long-term sick beneted the rest of the statutory health insurance pool through lower contribution rates.
As a rst estimate, we calculate the sick pay according to the old and the new regulations for every eligible individual and the years 1997 to 2006, take the dierence, and sum over the frequency-weighted number of long-term absences for the whole period.
Through the reform, the long-term sick pay has been cut on average by approximately e 300 per case and year. Since (reduced) social contributions are charged on long-term sick pay, the net cut per case was about e 250. Given that the average number of benet days equals about 2.5 months, this translates into a monthly net cut of about e 100, which represents about seven percent of the average monthly net wage.
Comparing the frequency-weighted number of SHI long-term sickness cases in the SOEP with the administrative data reveals that the SOEP underestimates the number of cases as well as the average benet days per case. This is not surprising since long-term sick people with very long sickness spells have a particularly high probability of not participating in the survey.
Consequently, we make use of administrative data from the German Ministry of Health on the total number of SHI long-term sick pay cases and the average number of benet days for SHI insured. Unfortunately, only the total number of eligible SHI insured people and the average length of sick pay received is publicly available. No personal data and no income information is collected. Hence, we combine administrative data with the SOEP dataset, which contains very detailed income information. By this means, we estimate the total reform induced SHI savings sum to lie around 5.5 billion euros between 1997 and
2006.
16 Considering the social contributions yields a net loss for the long-term sick of about ve billion euros.
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In the working paper version, we present a more detailed analysis of the redistributional eects. Various specications are discussed which dier in their assumptions concerning a miscalculation of the number of people receiving long-term sick pay between 1997 and 2000.
Discussion and Conclusion
Economists often assume that moral hazard is responsible for a signicant fraction of workplace absences, thereby contributing to rising health expenditures and labor costs. If this assumption holds true, it justies reductions in sick pay replacement levels, which would eventually lower absence rates and durations, increase eciency in the insurance market, and decrease health expenditures and labor costs. Several countries with public health insurance systems have indeed reduced the replacement levels for sick pay in recent years.
Concurrently, various studies have found that people adapt their short-term absence behavior to economic incentives, providing evidence of the existence of a considerable degree of moral hazard in the decision to go on sick leave.
The aim of this study has been to analyze the causal eects of cuts in sick pay on long-term absenteeism. In Germany, two health reforms came into force at the end of 1996. The rst reduced the compensation level for the rst six weeks of receiving sick pay from 100 percent to 80 percent of foregone gross wages. The second reduced the compensation level from the seventh week onwards from 80 to 70 percent.
We show that within a simple dynamic model of absence behavior, the net eect of the two reforms on long-term absenteeism is a priori unclear, as it is composed of two diverging eects. The direct eect increases the costs of being absent for long-term periods and leads to a decrease of long-term absenteeism. The indirect eect has a positive impact on long-term absenteeism since through the two reforms, the costs of being absent for a long term decreased relative to the costs of being absent for a short term. The reform eects are derived under the assumption that the individuals' sickness levels are independent of previous periods and that every sickness level is equally probable. If we relax this assumption and assume that employees who are sick for long-term periods are seriously ill, the sick pay incentive structure breaks down and employees who are sick long-term do not change their absence behavior as a reaction to moderate cuts in replacement levels.
The identication and estimation of the direct as well as the net eect is feasible by dierence-in-dierences. SOEP data and the two-tiered health insurance system in Germany allow us to identify subsamples that were aected by both reforms, only by the reduction in long-term sick pay, and by neither reform. Moreover, the legislator dened an upper limit for long-term sick pay that decreased from 100 percent of net wages to 90 percent of net wages as a consequence of the reform. Hence, an additional source of exogenous variation is provided that does not only allow us to assign employees to treatment and control groups but also makes it possible to dierentiate by treatment intensity in percent of the gross wage. Every part of the reform was distinctly exogenous to the individual and politically determined. Moreover, selection into or out of the treatment is not an issue here, as switching between the SHI and the PHI is not allowed due to rigid legal restrictions.
Our empirical ndings suggest that the health reforms have, for the population average, not led to a signicant change in the incidence and length of long-term absence spells.
These results are robust to various specications. Although we do not nd general reform eects, we nd evidence of heterogeneity in the eects. According to our estimates, the reform induced signicant decreases in the length of long-term sickness spells for the poor and middle-aged employees employed full-time.
The nding that the long-term sick have not adapted their sickness behavior to the monetary reform incentives in a signicant manner is in line with our model predictions if long-term sick people are assumed to be seriously ill. This is plausible since, in Germany, the most common causes for sickness spells of more than six weeks are chronic diseases of the spine, arthritis, accidents, cancer, and mental diseases. Moreover, 43 percent of the persons concerned have strong or very strong fears of being laid o and becoming unemployed (Müller et al., 1998) . Interestingly, our results are in contrast to a study from Sweden that found absence behavior to be aected considerably by economic incentives even when absence spells of more than 90 days are assessed. The dierences in the ndings might be due to a) cultural peculiarities, e.g. Germans are said to have a particularly strong work ethic, b) dierent monitoring systems for sick leave, c) dierent reform settings, e.g. in this study, on average, the treated faced a monthly long-term sick pay cut of around e 100 or seven percent of their net wage, d) the application of dierent econometric techniques, e.g., in contrast to the Swedish study, we do not rely on before-after estimates but use a control group.
By combining SOEP income data with administrative data, we estimate the total SHI reform savings from 1997 to 2006 to lie around 5.5 billion euros in real terms as of 2005.
Considering social contributions that are charged on long-term sick pay yields a sum of ve billion euros that was redistributed from the long-term sick to the insurance pool in order to achieve lower contribution rates.
Various pieces of evidence throughout this study allow us to infer that moral hazard is of minor importance when sickness spells of more than 30 days are considered. Consequently, health reforms like the German one do not lead to more ecient sickness insurance markets by decreasing moral hazard but are merely an instrument to cut health expenditures or labor costs. On the other hand, if introduced together with with moderate cuts in replacement levels, this cost containment instrument seems to be economically ecient in the sense that it induces no major behavioral changes that might lead to undesirable equilibria. Policy makers should be aware of the reform eects and the redistributional consequences. It is simply a normative question whether this instrument to cut health expenditures should be applied.
Further research on how sickness absence, moral hazard, and presenteeism are related to the design of insurance contracts is essential as it has short and long-term consequences for health expenditures, health outcomes, labor costs, and productivity. 1996-1997 1996-1997; balanced 1995 vs. 1997/1998 1995/1996 vs. 1998 Full 
